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ABSTRACT 
Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where 
individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player 
doesn’t have own authority to change their state. However in the human society, peoples do not just fol-
low strategies of other people, they choose their own strategy. In order to see the decision of each agent in 
timely basis and differentiate between network structures, we conducted multi-agent based modeling and 
simulation. In this paper, agent can decide its own strategy by payoff comparison and we name this agent 
as “Self-motivated agent”. To explain the behavior of self-motivated agent, prisoner’s dilemma game 
with cooperator, defector, loner and punisher are considered as an illustrative example. We performed 
simulation by differentiating participation rate, mutation rate and the degree of network, and found the 
special coexisting conditions. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Traditional evolutionary game describes how successful strategy spreads in population(Jörgen M. 
Weibull., 1995). Depending on the payoff structure, agent follows the strategy of most successful neigh-
bor. In that way the whole system adopt a certain strategy. But human society is more complicated that it 
is not explained by only adopting strategy. Still, there are many peoples trying to follow how other people 
live, but not everyone makes a decision by mimicking their role model. For example, by only using 
adopting strategy, we can’t explain how great politician grew up from bed neighborhood. Of course there 
is more probability that he/she will be up to he/she’s neck in crime. But he/she might have dreamed of 
changing the world, or had more advantage to get a good score while he/she is in bed neighborhood. Pre-
vious researches hadn’t focused on this characteristic of agent so that it is not a sufficient model to ex-
plain any autonomous society.  
In this paper, we suggest the decision process of “Self-motivated agent”. Self-motivated agent can 
guess which types of strategies are available regardless of their neighborhood, and it can voluntarily 
choose its strategy by comparing payoff and change its state by itself. Participants play prisoner’s dilem-
ma game with their neighborhood and find the maximum payoff that they can get, and finally change to 
relevant state.  
In our model, there are four types of player - cooperator, defector, loner and punisher. To explain so-
ciety more accurately, we added loner and punisher into traditional prisoner’s dilemma game. Loner, an 
agent with indifferent mind, gets fixed payoff(Dawes, 1980), and punisher is an agent introduced to pe-
nalize defector. (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006). And we also considered other 
three factors, participation rate and mutation rate, and network structure. 
Since every agent makes their decision at different time, we can say that only some of the players join 
the game on each time. To model this factor, we suggest participation rate to set how many players will 
participate in a time period. Surprisingly, this probability not only controls the speed of dynamics, but al-
so becomes the important factor of deciding the overall behavior of agents. And mutation is also adopted 
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in our model (Glenn W. Rowe, 1985). It corresponds to mutation in the DNA, or in cultural evolution it 
describes individuals experimenting with new behavior. Sometimes human-being also makes decision by 
throwing dice, which means they leave it to chance. Mutation is happened regardless of whether the agent 
is a participant or not.  
Complex network structure is also considered (S.Boccaletti et al., 2005). Six different networks are 
used in our paper, and we found different coexisting condition by changing network degree and structure. 
1.2 Previous Research 
As a famous example of game theory, prisoner's dilemma is a kind of non-zero-sum game where two 
people participate. If both players cooperate, they will get the largest benefit together. However, if both 
players choose selfish strategy to maximize personal gain, then they can’t get any profit and hence it turns 
out to be the dilemma. Even there are a lot of people, not two people with two-strategy of cooperators and 
defectors, we know that defectors prevail through replicator dynamics (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998). This 
result depicts our sociology (Dawes, 1980). 
From the point of view of evolutionary theory however, there is a problem that defectors prevail. 
Robert Axelord and William. D. Hamilton for the first time to solve these problems by using this game 
theory (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). This is just a matter of evolution theory and involve a lot of social 
issues(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000). In this way, the effort what you looking 
for that cooperator can emerge and persists through game theory is said Evolutionary Game Theory. 
In 1992, Martin A. Nowak and Robert M. May introduced a spatial structure (Nowak & May, 1992). 
Individuals are located in the normal grid, and collect the aggregate rewards of interaction with neighbors 
to mimic the strategy of the most successful neighbor. Studies on attributes about spatial structure in gen-
eral two-strategy game was carried (Ch Hauert, 2002). Additionally, in snow drift game, the effect of spa-
tial structure gave birth to other result (Christoph Hauert & Doebeli, 2004). Instead of these two-strategy 
games, they have also been studying games that some elements have been added.  
In biology, the phenomenon that three-strategy coexist have been founded (Zamudio & Sinervo, 
2000). And these systems have been simulated in rock-paper-scissors game (Kerr, Riley, Feldman, & 
Bohannan, 2002). From the point of view of evolutionary game theory, individual can follow a strategy of 
cooperators, defectors, and loners (Dawes, 1980). Regardless of neighbors, loners have the fixed payoff, 
hence they get more payoff than defectors. On the other hand, they don’t get benefit by participating in 
the game, so cooperators prevail around loners. Therefore, strategy of these three types is cyclic domi-
nant, so they coexist and overcome the dilemma (Hauert et al., 2002). Additionally, the concept of pun-
isher is suggested. Punisher has the opportunity to punish and imposes to co defecting co-players but 
these actions are costly (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006).  
In 2009, the concept of mutation in the game of four strategies, cooperators, defectors, loners, and 
punishers was introduced (Traulsen et al., 2009). A mutation occurs with probability mutation rate and a 
mutant switches to a different random strategy. The dynamics has changed as the mutation rate increases. 
Change of dynamic describes the cultural evolution differs from the genetic reproduction which has rare 
mutations. 
Previous researches have been carried out on lattice structures. More recently, interest in which lattice 
structure is extended by graphs and social networks has increased and it also affects evolutionary game 
theory. In the beginning, there is a research about evolutionary dynamics on graphs (Lieberman et al., 
2005). Each vertex of graph represents an individual and weighted edges of graph represent reproductive 
rate. The result shows that amplifying random drift or selection in evolutionary dynamics is determined 
by forms of graphs. In addition, it said how to access evolutionary games on graphs. 
Along this study, the critical point to prevail cooperators was founded by analytical and numerical 
simulations in two-strategy game of cooperators and defectors on several graphs and networks (Ohtsuki, 
Hauert, Lieberman, & Nowak, 2006). This system followed ‘death-birth’ process: in each time step, a 
random individual is chosen to die, and the neighbors compete for the empty site proportional to their fit-
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ness. Also, previous research demonstrated that agent's adaptive expectation plays an important role in 
cooperation emergence on complex networks (Ohtsuki et al., 2006). 
2 MODEL 
2.1 Strategies of Agent 
In our game, four different players exist. Cooperator is an agent that gives benefit b to all players except 
loner, but to be a cooperator it has to pay cost c for neighboring players except loner. Cooperator also gets 
benefit by neighboring cooperator. Defector also gets benefit by neighboring cooperator without paying 
any cost, but it gets certain amount of penalty   from neighboring punisher. In the simple game with these 
two types of agent, defector always has advantages over cooperator (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998). Loner 
is an agent who is not interested in this game, so it gets fixed payoff   regardless of having any types of 
neighbor. Becoming loner is the best strategy if there is no cooperator around, but if there exists any co-
operator neighbor agent will not choose to be a loner directly. At least it has to calculate different payoff 
functions if we assume total payoff of loner is bigger than benefit. Loner’s relevant payoff   between its 
opponent is set to be      . Punisher is an agent introduced to penalize defector like police officer. 
In our paper, punisher is not a type of cooperator, their function is just giving punishment to neighboring 
defectors. It is also benefited by neighboring cooperator but it has to bear small penalty       ) to penal-
ize neighboring defector. Comparing cost of altruism, penalty of defect and small penalty to penalize, c 
       is established. Because each cooperator has to pay maximum cost     by considering network 
degree of d, and it has to be smaller than   and  . Otherwise agent will not choose to do altruistic behav-
ior. We brought the concept of punisher and loner from previous research (Traulsen et al., 2009), but we 
put minor change of their role and payoff functions – in our model punisher doesn’t act as a cooperator, 
and cooperator doesn’t pay costs for neighboring loner .   
2.2 4-Person prisoner’s dilemma game 
Let’s consider people doing teamwork. We can divide people’s behavior into four different types. People 
who trust other people and shows altruism – cooperator, free-rider who only gets benefit from teammate – 
defector, person who is not interested in or not joining that work – loner, person who criticize bad team-
mate, but gets bed reputation because he always lays out a sermon – punisher (Greenberg J., & Baron, 
R.A, 1997). Agent in our model acts exactly as these four different types of people and decide their role 
by playing 4-person prisoner’s dilemma game with their neighbors. And the result will show how differ-
ent behavior agent shows according to change of parameter and network structure.   
 The model consists of N agents playing 4-person prisoner’s dilemma game. Agents are located on the 
vertices of network. In every simulation step, agents play game with other agents within their own neigh-
borhood. The agent can choose four strategies: cooperation, defection, indifferent, or punish. For example 
if player A is defector and player B is punisher, punisher give penalty to defector, and it also get minus 
payoff while penalizing, so their payoff for this game is (   ,   ). The payoff matrix is as follows : 
 
 Cooperator Defector Loner Punisher 
Cooperator ( b – c , b – c ) (   , b ) (   ,   ) (   , b ) 
Defector ( b , – c ) ( 0 , 0 ) ( 0 ,   ) (   ,    ) 
Loner (   , – c ) (   , 0 ) (   ,   ) (   ,  0 ) 
Punisher ( b , – c ) (   ,   ) ( 0 ,   ) ( 0 , 0 ) 
Table 1 : 4-person prisoner’s dilemma game used in our model 
By adding loner and punisher from the traditional prisoner’s dilemma game, dominant strategy is to 
choose loner for both players. So assuming that the agent plays prisoner’s dilemma game one by one with 
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its neighbor, we can estimate that all players eventually become loner. But if we consider the society of 
degree more than 1, agent has to deal with multiple neighbors. Present paper, we assume that each agent 
knows the strategy of their neighbors. Since each agent is facing with their neighborhoods in the game, it 
gathers all information of their neighborhoods states. And calculate how much total payoff it can get if it 
changes into certain state. Detailed explanation is in the next section.  
2.3 Update Mechanism 
To see the dynamics of transition and find different behavior, we added participation probability on our 
model. If participation rate is 1, every player in the game changes their state each time.  In each step, par-
ticipants are randomly selected depending on participation rate, and every participating agent calculates 
their expected payoff using the information of their neighbor. And player finally changes its state that 
guarantees maximum payoff.   If multiple maximum payoff value exists, agent picks one state randomly. 
In our simulation, small random number ɛ is added to the payoff function so that agent can pick the max-
imum payoff between four.  
 We only considered agent’s first-step neighbor to get payoff function. For example, there is an agent 
calculating their options and decide to be a defector. If there is a punisher on its neighbor and whether 
punisher has another defector on their neighborhood or not, penalty value for that defector doesn’t change.  
       The number of corresponding neighborhood – cooperator, defector, loner, punisher is counted as  
              For example, the payoff function of cooperator can be evaluated as      (      
  )   because it get benefits from    neighboring cooperators and pay costs c to (        ) neigh-
bors for altruistic acts.  
The payoff and final strategy can be described as follows :  
                          (        )    
                          
            (           )      
                          
                 
 
        
2.4 Spatial Structure  
Six types of complex networks are used in this paper. Lattice networks of Moore-neighborhood (Network 
degree d = 8) are used as a baseline to see the coexisting behavior depending on participation rate and 
mutation rate. And lattice network of von-Neumann neighborhood(d=4) and network with d=16 are used 
to compare how degree change affects behavior of agents. 
And Cellular(Rives, A. W., & Galitski, T. 2003), Core-Periphery(Borgatti, S. P., & Everett, M. G. 
2000), Erdős-Rényi,(Erdős, P., & Rényi, A. 1960), Scale-Free(Barabási , A. –L., & Albert, R. 1999), 
Small-World(Watts, D. J., & Strogatz S. H. 1998) network are used. These networks are complex net-
works on the ground of having heterogeneous network degree for each node.  
Previous research has proven that there are different critical points for cooperators to prevail over the sev-
eral types of complex networks. (Ohtsuki et al., 2006). And cooperation frequency fluctuations in a Bara-
bási and Albert (BA) network and Watts and Strogatz (WS) small world networks are compared (Bo.X, 
2012). In this paper, we found different coexisting points and interesting phenomena depending on net-
work structure and degree. 
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2.5 Participation rate and Mutation rate 
Participation rate p and mutation rate   plays the important role in our simulation. In our setting, partici-
pation rate decides how many agents decide to change their state on each time and mutation rate describes 
individuals experimenting with new behaviors. In our model, randomly selected participants play game 
first, and mutation occurs with probability   in each update step. Previous study suggests that adjusting 
mutation rate can result significant change in the societies (Traulsen et al., 2009), and we found different 
stationary states depending on participation rate and mutation rate. 
 
3 RESULT & DISCUSSION 
3.1 Simulation Setting 
Initially, 2,500 agents are located on the grid space, and four types of agents are randomly distributed 
throughout the space. The degree of the network is 8 by querying Moore neighborhood. For visualizing, 
we used grid space with world height 50 and width 50, and the bias is removed by using torus space. Par-
ticipation rate p and mutation rate   is varied in the interval [0, 1] and benefit b, cost c, penalty  , small 
penalty   is set to be 100, 5, 150, 50 respectively, And loner’s total payoff for this game is set to be b for 
Moore neighborhood. (  
 
 
  . Since initial place of agent located can affect the final coexisting proba-
bility, we simulated 30 times by changing random seeds. In our simulation, we simulated by controlling 
participation rate and mutation rate together by batch run. We picked 4 participation rate p = 0.0001, 0.01, 
0.1, 1 by changing mutation rate   = 0, 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.01. Our null hypothesis is when p = 1,   = 0. 
Table 2 and 3 shows the simulation parameters and virtual experiment design. 
 
Figure Value 
 Number Of Agent 2500 
Space Height 50 
Space Width 50 
Benefit (b) 100 
Cost (c) 5 
Penalty (β) 50 
Small Penalty (γ) 15 
Loner's payoff (σ) 12.5 
 Table 2 : Simulation parameters 
 
 
Experiment Variable name Experiment Design Implication 
Participation rate (p) 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1(4 cases) Participation rate of each agent 
Mutation rate (   0, 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1 (5 cases) Randomly mutated rate 
Simulation ending time 10000 ticks Stable point for simulation 
Each experiment is replicated 30 times by changing random seeds. 
Table 3 : Virtual experiment design of scenario of interests 
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3.2 Participation rate & Mutation rate 
Participation and Mutation rate are important factors that decide coexisting condition. We simulated 4-
agent prisoner’s dilemma game by controlling Participation rate and Mutation rate. Figure 1 describes 
simple example of how coexisting probability and behavior changes depending on the participation rate 
and mutation rate. Red, blue, green, black dots are cooperator, defector, loner, and punisher agents. Left is 
a stable situation with p = 1,   = 0. Middle is loner-dominant society after changing mutation rate to   = 
0.01. Right you can see coexistence again by changing p = 0.1. We can say that stable structure is col-
lapsed by adopting mutation, because cooperators who give benefit have a chance to change into other 
agents and their neighborhoods decide to change themselves in the next step. But by put participation rate 
into our simulation, we can slow down the second part of the action and give more chance to survive the 
coexisting structure. 
(Fixed parameters : 2,500 agents in grid space with Moore neighborhood, b=100, c=5,  =150,  =50) 
 
 
Figure 1 : Simulation results of changing participation rate and mutation rate  
(Left : p = 1,   = 0, Middle : p = 1,   = 0.01, Right : p = 0.1,   = 0.01) 
 
We define coexistence value   to measure how equally four types of agents are spread throughout the so-
ciety, which is equal to √           
 . By using this value, we can easily conclude that condition, 
p = 1,   = 0, results in highest coexistence value. 
 Interesting fact is that, when mutation rate is small cooperator is dominant when participation rate is 
the smallest. For example,   = 0.0001, 0.001 number of cooperators is the largest when p = 0.001.  
But   becomes 0.01, cooperator is dominant when p = 0.01. When      , number of cooperator is the 
largest when p = 0.1. On the other hand, when p = 0.001, number of cooperator is the largest when 
          As participation rate becomes higher, number of cooperator become larger when higher value 
of mutation rate is obtained. 
 Table 3 summarized our results by calculating average number of each agents and result of t-test. We 
can find that coexisting condition changes depending on participation rate and mutation rate. And Figure 
2 shows that   becomes larger when more agents mutate with small participation rate. To compare with 
other networks, number of agent is set as 1,000. Null hypothesis is p = 1,   = 0 for the case of   = 0. And 
for each participation rate,    = 0 is set as null hypothesis. (+: P < 0.05, *: P < 0.01). 
 
Participation 
rate 
Mutation 
rate 
Cooperator Defector Loner Punisher Coexistence 
Value   Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
0.001 0.0001 277.0 -6.6* 211.1 -4.2* 310.5 8.4* 201.5 -4.6* 245.9 
0.001 0.001 377.9 18.4
* 217.7 -2.9* 195.1 -9.5* 209.3 -4.5* 240.7 
0.001 0.01 268.4 -16.7* 234.1 1.6 258.7 13.4* 238.7 4.7* 249.6 
0.001 0.1 251.4 -24.3* 247.0 7.6* 248.9 8.3* 252.3 10.4* 249.9 
0.01 0.0001 162.4 -15.1* 134.8 -11.0* 567.2 13.9* 135.7 -12.3* 202.6 
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0.01 0.001 171.6 -16.6* 145.9 -12.1* 529.6 16.1* 153.0 -9.3* 212.2 
0.01 0.01 380.3 32.6
* 214.6 5.4* 196.5 -45.8* 208.6 3.6* 240.5 
0.01 0.1 271.1 -0.1 236.7 16.5* 252.7 -27.4* 238.9 16.5* 249.5 
0.1 0.0001 142.0 -23.9* 118.0 -21.7* 622.0 21.8* 118.0 -15.3* 187.3 
0.1 0.001 3.7 -377.8* 10.0 -221.7* 977.7 302.6* 8.7 -202.8* 23.6 
0.1 0.01 140.0 -19.2* 132.9 -15.2* 590.6 18.6* 136.5 -12.7* 196.8 
0.1 0.1 375.6 28.3
* 205.1 0.4 202.6 -41.4* 216.3 9.7* 241.1 
1 0.0001 100.0 -30.3* 84.6 -23.8* 731.0 28.4* 84.2 -25.3* 151.1 
1 0.001 1.4 -408.7* 2.3 -287.5* 994.7 383.1* 1.6 -405.0* 8.5 
1 0.01 4.7 -350.0* 12.0 -163.1* 973.4 285.9* 10.2 -197.0* 27.3 
1 0.1 212.1 -7.7
* 174.3 -5.4* 445.6 7.5* 168.3 -5.6* 229.5 
0.001 0 315.5 7.8* 230.0 3.9* 226.1 -12.0* 228.5 6.0* 247.4 
0.01 0 271.5 0.4 200.1 -0.2 330.7 -0.3 197.8 0.6 244.1 
0.1 0 268.2 -0.2 204.1 0.6 336.0 0.1 191.9 -0.6 243.7 
1 0 269.1 0.0 201.2 0.0 335.2 0.0 194.4 0.0 243.7 
 
Table 3 : Different coexisting condition by changing participation and mutation rate (Moore, 1000) 
 
 
Figure 2 : Coexistence value (left) and Number of cooperator (right) of each cases 
 
3.3 Network degree 
We conducted same simulation by changing network into von-Neumann neighborhood, which has net-
work degree of 4. Interestingly, we found that number of loner increase than the previous simulation with 
Moore neighborhood. The main reason loner becomes dominant is because degree of neighborhood is de-
creased to 4, which means that chance of having cooperator neighborhood is decreased. As agent doesn’t 
have any cooperator neighborhood, they can’t choose to be cooperator, defector, and loner because their 
payoff function becomes negative or 0. But in our payoff function, loner get non-zero payoff for any cir-
cumstances so agent with no cooperator neighbor will become loner eventually. On the other hand, by 
simulating network with degree = 16, larger number of cooperator and coexistence value is observed. 
Null hypothesis here is the same case of Moore neighborhood. (+: P < 0.05, *: P < 0.01). 
 
Participation 
 rate 
Mutation 
rate 
Cooperator Defector Loner Punisher Coexistence 
Value   Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
0.001 0.0001 51.1 -116.7* 94.8 -47.0* 756.7 72.4
* 97.5 -39.5* 137.5 
0.001 0.001 206.2 -66.8* 234.7 5.2* 327.9 42.3* 231.3 6.6* 246.1 
0.001 0.01 243.4 -9.0* 245.0 4.0* 261.3 1.0 250.1 4.9* 249.8 
0.001 0.1 248.6 -1.1 249.9 1.3 248.6 -0.1 252.6 0.1 249.9 
0.01 0.0001 7.5 -211.7* 13.5 -125.8* 965.4 153.3
* 13.6 -113.7* 34.0 
Kim and Lee 
 
0.01 0.001 34.9 -111.0* 73.8 -33.6* 816.5 65.0* 74.9 -39.4* 112.0 
0.01 0.01 205.0 -59.6* 233.5 6.3* 328.9 36.4* 231.9 8.5* 245.8 
0.01 0.1 249.5 -9.2
* 245.8 4.0* 255.5 1.0 248.9 3.8* 249.9 
0.1 0.0001 2.8 -244.4* 4.4 -143.2* 988.3 170.8
* 4.4 -139.3* 15.3 
0.1 0.001 2.9 -2.1+ 8.9 -1.6 979.7 1.5 8.7 0.0 21.7 
0.1 0.01 34.3 -84.7* 75.9 -29.4* 812.8 52.3* 77.9 -26.9* 113.3 
0.1 0.1 215.5 -52.3
* 230.3 8.1* 317.0 30.6* 237.1 9.5* 247.2 
1 0.0001 1.6 -257.6* 2.1 -172.2* 993.6 182.1* 2.6 -139.1* 9.7 
1 0.001 0.3 -10.6* 1.0 -6.0* 997.6 5.3
* 1.0 -2.0+ 4.0 
1 0.01 3.6 -2.1+ 8.8 -3.3* 978.4 2.5* 9.2 -1.2 23.1 
1 0.1 41.7 -112.1
* 89.0 -42.0* 785.3 75.0* 85.2 -36.7* 125.6 
0.001 0 106.8 -69.5* 169.0 -13.0* 558.4 37.8* 165.8 -17.2* 202.2 
0.01 0 67.6 -109.7* 90.3 -48.9* 753.4 69.4* 88.8 -49.3* 142.1 
0.1 0 63.0 -92.6* 84.2 -45.4* 768.8 57.7* 84.1 -37.8* 136.1 
1 0 72.1 -92.2* 94.3 -39.2* 737.3 54.9* 95.5 -35.9* 147.9 
Table 4 : Simulation result with von-Neumann neighborhood lattice  
 
 
Participation 
 rate 
Mutation 
rate 
Cooperator Defector Loner Punisher Coexistence  
Value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
0.001 0.0001 263.6 -3.4* 225.3 3.3* 273.6 -7.2* 237.4 8.5* 249.2 
0.001 0.001 422.4 14.5
* 219.1 0.4 131.7 -25.5* 226.9 5.3* 229.3 
0.001 0.01 292.5 9.6* 238.7 2.1+ 234.4 -9.6* 234.9 -1.5 249.0 
0.001 0.1 256.4 2.4* 245.2 -0.7 247.5 -0.6* 251.3 -0.5 250.1 
0.01 0.0001 172.4 2.0 145.0 2.2+ 538.6 -2.3+ 144.0 2.2+ 209.9 
0.01 0.001 262.2 21.3* 223.8 14.4* 276.9 -30.1* 237.0 15.6* 249.1 
0.01 0.01 419.1 16.9
* 226.7 3.7* 131.7 -33.4* 221.8 4.0* 229.5 
0.01 0.1 290.6 8.2* 241.3 1.7+ 227.7 -13.0* 240.6 0.9 249.0 
0.1 0.0001 153.5 2.0 126.1 1.8+ 596.8 -1.7+ 123.6 1.2 194.4 
0.1 0.001 155.6 34.7* 131.0 34.1* 578.8 -36.3* 134.7 33.1* 199.6 
0.1 0.01 264.1 25.6* 227.6 20.1* 277.6 -40.1* 229.8 18.2* 248.8 
0.1 0.1 414.6 14.3
* 218.9 4.5* 140.6 -27.5* 227.1 2.9* 232.0 
1 0.0001 138.7 10.6* 116.3 9.7* 630.2 -10.7* 114.8 10.0* 184.8 
1 0.001 127.1 28.0* 106.7 31.4* 660.6 -31.4* 105.6 33.5* 175.4 
1 0.01 142.7 25.1* 120.9 31.3* 611.4 -29.8* 124.6 29.2* 190.4 
1 0.1 267.3 13.8
* 218.4 9.3* 287.2 -20.1* 226.5 12.1* 248.2 
0.001 0 283.3 -8.4* 270.3 5.5* 166.7 -12.8* 279.7 7.9* 244.5 
0.01 0 197.2 -18.7* 161.5 -12.0* 476.0 15.0* 165.2 -10.2* 223.7 
0.1 0 198.5 -14.5* 164.7 -11.0* 472.5 12.3* 164.3 -9.0* 224.5 
1 0 192.1 -24.9* 159.8 -16.5* 486.5 22.0* 161.6 -14.1* 221.6 
 
Table 5 : Simulation result with lattice, degree=16 
 
3.4 Network Structure 
We conducted same simulation by applying complex network structures. Cellular, Core-periphery, Erdős-
Rényi, Small-world, Scale-free network with same number of node and edge are used. Since network de-
gree of each node diverse in complex network, random seed which decides agent’s initial distribution 
over the network becomes critical here. For example, if node with degree 100 is chosen as a cooperator, 
its 100 neighbors will get benefit by it, so overall agent dynamics will reflect that positive effect. In that 
case, much more cooperators will be survived to the end. Figure 3 shows how different the stable states of 
agent will change, depending on the initial condition by changing random seed (Network information: 
Erdős-Rényi random network with       ,    ).  
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Figure 3 : Different agent behavior by changing random seed 
 
We used meta-network assessment and analysis tool ORA(Carley, Kathleen M et al., 2012) to generate 
six different stylized networks. To restrict our focus into network structure, we fixed the number of nodes 
to 1,000 and made number of edge as close as 8,000. We didn’t remove any surplus edges not to destruct 
network characteristic. Table 6 shows detail explanation of each network.  
 
Network 
Number of 
Node 
Number of 
Edge 
Other information 
Grid(Moore) 1,000, 2,500   Used Grid space provided by Repast 
Grid(von-
Neumann) 
1,000, 2,500   Used Grid space provided by Repast 
Lattice 1,000 8,000 Directed Degree of 8 - Number of neighbor : 16 
Cellular 1,000 7,995 Number of Cells : 52, Inner Density : 0.40, Outer Density : 0.10 
Core-Periphery 1,000 8,003 Proportion of core nodes : 0.13, Density of core nodes : 0.50 
Erdős-Rényi, 1,000 8,000 Total density : 0.008 (symmetric) 
Scale-Free 1,000 8,004 
Probability of node connecting to core : 0.008 
Initial node count(core) : 40,  Initial density(core) : 0.01 
Number of node connected by edge : 891 (109 nodes has degree 0) 
Small-World 1,000 8,005 
Number of neighbors : 8, Probability of removing neighbor : 0.05 
Probability of adding for neighbor : 0.055, Power law exponent : 
0.055 
Network made by ORA, which is directed graph, but we used it as un-directed. 
Table 6 : Specific Network Information 
 
We found the result of networks having heterogeneous degree is more fluctuated than homogeneous net-
work by observing standard deviation. Figure 4, 5 shows the mean and standard deviation of each agent 
type. In the condition of p=0.1, μ=0.001, Erdős-Rényi and Scale-free network has the biggest standard 
deviation because of their diversity of node degree. Cooperator is not appeared in lattice network since 
stable structure is broken because of mutation rate (Section 3.2). However by changing graph structure, 
we can find coexisting behavior in three types of networks – Erdős-Rényi, Scale-free, Small-world. 
Simulation results by varying network structures are in APPENDIX. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Random Seed (1-30) 
Punisher
Loner
Defactor
Cooperator
Kim and Lee 
 
  
 
Figure 4 : Average number of agent by changing network structure (p=0.1, μ=0.001) 
 
 
 
Figure 5 : Standard deviation of agent by changing network structure(p=0.1, μ=0.001) 
 
3.5 Limitation of our simulation model 
In our model, we used pre-defined participation rate and mutation rate value, to verify that those parame-
ters affect our model stochastically. But in the real world agent can decide themselves whether joining for 
certain game on each time, it is not decided by force. And agents can choose different strategy by their 
own utility function, not just combining the payoff depending on their neighborhood. Making agents pay-
off heterogeneous depends on each agent’s background will be needed to show organizational behavior 
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better. In order to use self-motivated agent model in the real world, calibration depending on the situation 
is needed. Diverse type of real world dataset will be needed to explain the society.  
 Second, we assume that each agent knows current state of its neighbors. But in real life, information 
imbalance makes not everyone can decide their decision in optimal way. Also more accurate initial condi-
tion will be considered. 
 Last, stochastic difference can be occurred, if sequence of applying participation rate and mutation 
rate is changed.  Although we reflect participation and mutation is independent, our result shows that 
there is a correlation between two variables.  
4 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we studied the behavior of 4 different types of self-motivated agents playing N-person pris-
oner’s dilemma game. By using agent based modeling, we can reflect the agent’s mutation and participa-
tion in stochastic way. And we could observe different behavior by changing network structure. 
 We found the impact of participation rate and mutation rate on agent society. Degree of network is al-
so very critical factor changing population of each agent type. And we found that structure of network is 
important in that each agent affect society different according to heterogeneity. Besides some cases espe-
cially in Erdős-Rényi, network, we found the phenomenon that initial location of agent affect their coex-
isting condition critically. 
 For further work, we will compare how self-motivated agent behaves different with agents in tradi-
tional evolutionary games. By comparing different coexisting condition, we can analyze which model ex-
plains our human nature and society better. Also, we will put different utility function while calculating 
payoff for emphasizing heterogeneity of agent. Last, we will prove how participation rate affects with 
mutation rate in analytical way.  
A APPENDIX 
Table 5 to 8 is the simulation result of agents’ behavior in different complex networks. We can find that 
participation – mutation relation is also followed in complex networks. Null hypothesis is p = 1,   = 0 for 
the case of   = 0. And for each participation rate,    = 0 is set as null hypothesis. (+: P < 0.05, *: P < 0.01). 
 
Participation 
 rate 
Mutation 
rate 
Cooperator Defector Loner Punisher Coexistence 
Value   Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
0.001 0.0001 115.1 -24.5* 101.8 -7.7* 527.2 38.3* 255.9 -39.2* 199.4 
0.001 0.001 417.2 72.4
* 153.8 8.6* 140.2 -14.0* 288.6 -63.4* 225.8 
0.001 0.01 299.1 34.2* 230.4 45.4* 237.3 27.8* 233.3 -92.6* 248.5 
0.001 0.1 254.2 15.2* 249.2 47.4* 246.7 41.2* 249.7 -95.4* 250.0 
0.01 0.0001 9.8 3.0* 20.4 8.3* 949.9 -9.2* 19.8 7.1* 44.1 
0.01 0.001 145.4 23.1* 139.7 21.6* 469.9 -43.5* 245.1 34.1* 219.9 
0.01 0.01 413.0 119.7
* 156.2 55.8* 140.3 -424.3* 291.1 61.1* 226.6 
0.01 0.1 293.5 110.2* 237.2 84.6* 229.2 -328.1* 240.4 110.9* 248.9 
0.1 0.0001 2.8 -6.9* 3.1 -2.5* 990.6 3.7* 3.5 0.0 13.2 
0.1 0.001 13.1 2.3* 21.2 6.2* 942.0 -8.6* 23.4 10.9* 49.7 
0.1 0.01 135.9 28.5* 123.3 27.5* 495.0 -46.4* 245.2 33.4* 212.3 
0.1 0.1 416.5 133.6
* 163.8 60.0* 144.9 -336.0* 276.4 79.6* 228.7 
1 0.0001 1.5 -4.9* 1.1 -3.4* 996.9 4.8* 0.5 -7.1* 5.3 
1 0.001 7.4 1.5 5.8 2.2+ 982.7 -2.2+ 4.1 3.0* 20.3 
1 0.01 14.1 4.7* 21.6 7.5* 941.3 -10.0* 23.3 9.7* 50.8 
1 0.1 134.0 26.1
* 131.4 20.8* 513.3 -44.2* 219.2 36.5* 211.0 
0.001 0 216.9 33.3* 138.3 20.7* 165.9 -119.7* 478.9 58.4* 221.0 
0.01 0 5.8 0.6 3.7 1.0 988.1 -0.8 2.5 0.9 15.1 
0.1 0 8.5 1.7+ 4.8 1.8+ 983.1 -1.8+ 3.5 1.9+ 19.4 
1 0 4.9 0.0 2.8 0.0 990.3 0.0 2.0 0.0 12.7 
Table 7 : Simulation result with Cellular Network  
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Participation 
 rate 
Mutation 
rate 
Cooperator Defector Loner Punisher Coexistence 
Value   Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
0.001 0.0001 26.4 -0.1 38.9 -10.4* 834.3 14.2* 100.3 -20.1* 96.3 
0.001 0.001 180.3 64.3* 206.1 39.4* 399.2 -60.6* 214.6 5.4* 237.5 
0.001 0.01 240.9 101.4* 236.4 59.7* 288.8 -163.0* 234.7 12.1* 249.3 
0.001 0.1 251.2 104.6
* 246.7 64.2* 249.7 -189.3* 252.7 24.5* 250.1 
0.01 0.0001 2.9 8.2* 26.8 3.7* 955.2 -5.5* 15.1 5.3* 32.5 
0.01 0.001 26.3 17.3* 38.6 6.6* 833.8 -17.0* 101.3 18.7* 96.2 
0.01 0.01 178.4 79.2* 211.3 85.4* 394.4 -137.1* 216.5 79.1* 238.2 
0.01 0.1 238.8 105.5
* 240.0 93.1* 280.6 -270.0* 240.8 94.4* 249.4 
0.1 0.0001 0.2 2.5* 2.3 1.2 996.9 -1.5 0.6 2.1+ 4.2 
0.1 0.001 3.5 5.2* 20.7 3.5* 960.6 -4.7* 14.8 3.3* 32.0 
0.1 0.01 26.0 21.5* 33.9 18.8* 835.8 -24.2* 104.7 18.8* 93.7 
0.1 0.1 186.3 97.3
* 211.9 86.8* 387.9 -206.2* 214.9 94.3* 239.5 
1 0.0001 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1000.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
1 0.001 0.4 3.3* 0.4 3.6* 999.1 -6.1* 0.3 3.2* 2.4 
1 0.01 3.3 7.8* 20.5 2.9* 958.0 -4.6* 19.1 4.0* 33.4 
1 0.1 28.3 18.2
* 43.0 12.3* 809.4 -25.5* 120.1 27.6* 104.3 
0.001 0 26.6 18.2* 104.5 22.9* 668.4 -37.7* 200.5 55.0* 138.9 
0.01 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1000.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.1 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1000.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1000.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Table 8 : Simulation result with Core-Periphery Network  
 
Participation 
 rate 
Mutation 
rate 
Cooperator Defector Loner Punisher Coexistence 
Value   Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
0.001 0.0001 222.0 -14.6* 55.2 -27.7* 181.7 8.7* 541.1 24.9* 186.3 
0.001 0.001 422.2 -11.9
* 193.0 -0.7 136.1 46.6* 248.8 -20.5* 229.2 
0.001 0.01 286.9 -76.2* 239.1 20.2* 239.2 91.3* 235.5 -36.2* 249.3 
0.001 0.1 252.7 -86.2* 247.1 20.4* 247.2 94.8* 252.6 -33.7* 249.9 
0.01 0.0001 127.5 1.3 80.8 0.4 530.8 -3.2* 261.2 4.8* 194.4 
0.01 0.001 131.6 8.6* 33.7 -35.9* 332.9 -44.9* 501.6 69.1* 164.9 
0.01 0.01 416.6 136.2
* 203.5 41.4* 138.7 -320.3* 241.8 30.0* 230.9 
0.01 0.1 280.5 75.9* 241.9 67.8* 233.4 -215.2* 244.1 48.2* 249.3 
0.1 0.0001 0.3 -572.7* 1.3 -158.5* 996.7 233.0* 1.5 -128.2* 4.9 
0.1 0.001 120.6 2.8* 107.6 3.1* 522.1 -6.6* 249.3 6.4* 202.8 
0.1 0.01 135.0 21.7* 36.7 -0.4 325.1 -66.3* 504.1 90.7* 168.8 
0.1 0.1 412.3 146.8
* 204.0 51.7* 145.3 -354.8* 240.7 54.5* 232.9 
1 0.0001 0.0 -899.0* 0.1 -253.4* 999.7 373.2* 0.2 -184.6* 0.9 
1 0.001 0.2 -379.0* 0.8 -145.5* 997.8 189.9* 1.1 -88.3* 3.7 
1 0.01 132.1 7.7* 450.2 34.6* 372.1 -23.9* 45.9 4.6* 178.5 
1 0.1 154.6 25.1
* 41.2 13.7* 288.9 -61.5* 512.6 67.8* 175.2 
0.001 0 454.6 117.4* 194.9 18.3* 32.2 -817.2* 318.4 26.0* 173.6 
0.01 0 93.8 2.2+ 73.4 2.5* 716.3 -3.2* 116.5 4.2* 154.8 
0.1 0 56.2 1.0 37.1 0.6 864.0 -0.9 42.6 1.1 93.6 
1 0 30.0 0.0 26.6 0.0 921.4 0.0 22.0 0.0 63.4 
Table 9 : Simulation result with Erdős-Rényi, Network  
 
Participation 
 rate 
Mutation 
rate 
Cooperator Defector Loner Punisher Coexistence 
Value   Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
0.001 0.0001 93.0 -63.5* 31.6 -100.1* 341.3 28.2* 425.0 9.0* 143.7 
0.001 0.001 338.5 2.8
* 176.3 6.4* 136.1 43.5* 240.0 -29.8* 210.1 
0.001 0.01 252.5 -24.7* 213.3 22.4* 213.0 63.2* 212.3 -66.5* 222.1 
0.001 0.1 222.3 -43.0* 217.4 27.2* 225.0 64.1* 224.6 -51.7* 222.3 
0.01 0.0001 100.2 3.8* 96.0 3.1* 476.3 -6.7* 218.4 7.8* 177.9 
0.01 0.001 84.6 26.7* 28.6 24.5* 383.2 -52.7* 394.7 55.4* 138.3 
0.01 0.01 339.2 142.8
* 176.5 48.7* 139.3 -452.3* 236.2 44.2* 210.7 
0.01 0.1 248.8 92.6* 211.4 75.4* 215.9 -214.7* 213.6 84.6* 221.9 
0.1 0.0001 50.8 2.6* 100.5 3.0* 713.1 -3.0* 26.4 2.5* 99.0 
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0.1 0.001 65.8 3.7* 140.2 4.2* 543.4 -8.1* 141.7 9.6* 163.2 
0.1 0.01 84.7 23.1* 29.3 26.8* 381.8 -61.0* 394.9 73.4* 139.1 
0.1 0.1 337.1 121.8
* 184.9 52.8* 138.9 -435.5* 228.4 48.9* 210.9 
1 0.0001 82.9 3.4* 136.4 3.7* 631.9 -3.7* 39.8 2.9* 129.9 
1 0.001 113.5 4.6
* 226.9 5.6* 504.8 -5.5* 45.7 4.2* 156.1 
1 0.01 107.9 6.0* 247.0 6.2* 380.9 -11.0* 152.6 5.1* 198.4 
1 0.1 94.9 24.8* 32.2 22.0* 355.0 -53.1* 410.4 57.8* 145.2 
0.001 0 331.3 46.7* 159.2 19.3* 44.1 -354.4* 356.3 27.5* 169.7 
0.01 0 17.8 1.4 9.6 1.4 830.5 -1.6 33.2 1.6 46.6 
0.1 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 891.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 891.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Table 10 : Simulation result with Scale-Free Network  
 
Participation 
 rate 
Mutation 
rate 
Cooperator Defector Loner Punisher Coexistence 
Value   Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value Mean t-value 
0.001 0.0001 286.1 -9.3* 169.3 -11.8* 217.6 16.6* 327.0 -4.9* 242.3 
0.001 0.001 416.7 25.3
* 189.0 -12.7* 136.1 17.0* 258.2 -24.8* 229.4 
0.001 0.01 291.6 -12.7* 238.1 7.0* 234.6 55.0* 235.9 -42.0* 249.0 
0.001 0.1 254.5 -31.9* 249.2 12.5* 244.3 81.8* 250.6 -41.0* 249.6 
0.01 0.0001 248.4 3.9* 212.9 1.1 324.0 -3.5* 214.5 4.1* 246.2 
0.01 0.001 275.5 9.5* 155.4 -12.6* 240.1 -16.1* 328.7 27.9* 241.1 
0.01 0.01 422.9 60.3
* 195.8 -3.8* 134.2 -112.7* 247.6 11.9* 229.0 
0.01 0.1 284.1 27.3* 241.7 13.4* 229.8 -63.4* 245.0 20.0* 249.3 
0.1 0.0001 242.7 3.8* 212.3 2.0+ 338.8 -3.3* 205.9 2.6* 244.8 
0.1 0.001 249.2 5.8* 210.2 1.9+ 316.8 -6.7* 223.9 7.8* 246.9 
0.1 0.01 280.4 14.7* 168.3 -5.9* 232.5 -19.6* 319.2 24.1* 243.3 
0.1 0.1 419.1 65.6
* 196.8 -2.4* 141.5 -107.4* 244.0 12.3* 231.0 
1 0.0001 233.1 2.2+ 210.9 2.3+ 359.3 -1.8+ 196.7 0.1 242.8 
1 0.001 241.9 4.2* 214.5 3.4* 339.8 -3.7* 203.9 2.0+ 244.9 
1 0.01 248.9 4.7* 216.8 3.4* 314.8 -5.3* 219.5 4.8* 247.1 
1 0.1 296.9 15.0
* 180.0 -3.8* 221.1 -22.1* 301.4 19.3* 244.3 
0.001 0 327.1 27.4* 222.5 3.0* 103.8 -67.7* 346.6 19.5* 226.2 
0.01 0 223.7 0.8 207.9 1.3 370.1 -1.1 198.3 0.6 241.7 
0.1 0 221.3 0.0 202.3 0.0 378.4 0.0 197.9 0.0 240.6 
1 0 219.5 0.0 200.1 0.0 384.0 0.0 196.3 0.0 239.9 
Table 11 : Simulation result with Small-World Network  
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